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ABSTRACT
This article examines the potential contribution to bank supervision of a model
designed to predict which banks will have their supervisory ratings downgraded
in future periods.  Bank supervisors rely on various tools of off-site surveillance
to track the condition of banks under their jurisdiction between on-site
examinations, including econometric models.  One of the models that the Federal
Reserve System uses for surveillance was estimated to predict bank failures.
Because bank failures have been so rare during the last decade, the coefficients on
this model have been “frozen” since 1991.  Each quarter the surveillance staff at
the Board of Governors provide the supervision staff in the Reserve Banks the
probabilities of failure by the banks subject to Fed supervision, based on the
coefficients of this bank failure model and the latest call report data for each bank.
The number of banks downgraded to problem status in recent years has been
substantially larger than the number of bank failures.  During a period of few
bank failures, the relevance of this bank failure model for surveillance depends to
some extent on the accuracy of the model in predicting which banks will have
their supervisory ratings downgraded to problem status in future periods.  This
paper compares the ability of two models to predict downgrades of supervisory
ratings to problem status: the Board staff model, which was estimated to predict
bank failures, and a model estimated to predict downgrades of supervisory
ratings.  We find that both models do about as well in predicting downgrades of
supervisory ratings for the early 1990s.  Over time, however, the ability of the
downgrade model to predict downgrades improves relative to that of the modelThe Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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estimated to predict failures.  This pattern reflects the value of using a model for
surveillance that can be re-estimated frequently.  We conclude that the downgrade
model may prove to be a useful supplement to the Board's model for estimating
failures during periods when most banks are healthy, but that the downgrade
model should not be considered a replacement for the current surveillance
framework.
Key words: bank supervision, early warning models, and off-site surveillance.
JEL Codes: G21, G28, and C53The Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Banking is one of the more closely supervised industries in the United States,
reflecting the view that bank failures have stronger adverse effects on economic activity
than other business failures.  The federal government and the state governments grant
authority to bank supervisors to limit the risk of failure assumed by banks.  Supervisors
impose sanctions on the banks that they have identified as being in poor financial
condition.  Effective bank supervision, therefore, requires accurate information about the
condition of banks.
Bank supervisors use on-site examination and off-site surveillance to identify the
banks most likely to fail.  The most useful tool for identifying problem institutions is on-
site examination, in which examiners travel to a bank and review all aspects of its safety
and soundness.  On-site examination is, however, both costly and burdensome: costly to
supervisors because of its labor-intensive nature and burdensome to bankers because of
the intrusion into their day-to-day operations.  As a result, supervisors also monitor bank
condition off-site.  Off-site surveillance yields an ongoing picture of bank condition,
enabling supervisors to schedule and plan exams efficiently.  Off-site surveillance also
provides banks with incentives to maintain safety and soundness between on-site visits.
Supervisors rely primarily on two analytical tools for off-site surveillance:
supervisory screens and econometric models.  Supervisory screens are combinations of
financial ratios, derived from bank balance sheets and income statements, that have, inThe Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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the past, given forewarning of safety-and-soundness problems.  Supervisors draw on their
experience to weigh the information content of these ratios.
One of the contributions of economists to bank supervision has been the
estimation and simulation of econometric models designed to provide supervisors with
early warning of the banks that are most likely to develop serious problems in the future.
Econometric models use the information about the condition of banks in their financial
statements to derive one number.  In most early warning models, that number is the
probability that a bank will fail in a future period.  In a recent article the authors
compared the accuracy of supervisory screens and econometric models in predicting
which banks would fail in future periods, and in predicting which banks would have their
supervisory ratings downgraded to problem bank status (Gilbert, Meyer and Vaughan,
1999).  Our analysis and other research demonstrate that econometric models dominate
supervisory screens as predictors of bank failure and downgrades of supervisory ratings.
The Federal Reserve System uses the System to Estimate Examination Ratings, or
SEER model, as one of its principal off-site surveillance tools.  Surveillance staff at the
Board of Governors use one form of this model, the risk rank model, to compute a
probability of failure for each bank.  Because bank failures have been so rare during the
last decade, the coefficients on this model have been “frozen” since 1991.  Each quarter
supervisors at each of the twelve Reserve Banks receive information from the
surveillance staff of the Board of Governors about the probabilities of failure by the
banks that are supervised by Federal Reserve staff.  Probabilities of failure are calculated
using the latest call report data for each bank and the “frozen” coefficients of the model
estimated to predict bank failure.The Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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This paper investigates a practical issue in the use of econometric models in bank
surveillance: the number of models that are relevant for surveillance.  That is, does a
model estimated to predict which banks are most likely to fail in future periods also
provide accurate predictions of which banks are most likely to be downgraded to problem
bank status?  Or do supervisors need a different model to predict which banks they are
most likely to rate as problem banks in future periods?  Ability to predict downgrades of
supervisory ratings, rather than failures, is especially relevant for surveillance during a
period in which there are few failures, like most of the 1990s.  We compare the
performance of two econometric models in predicting which banks will have their
supervisory ratings downgraded in future periods: the SEER risk rank model, which was
estimated to predict bank failures, and another model that is estimated to predict
downgrades of supervisory ratings.
II. ON-SITE AND OFF-SITE SURVEILLANCE: A CLOSER LOOK
This section discusses the role of off-site surveillance and early warning models
in bank supervision.  Bank supervisors rely principally on regular on-site examinations to
assess the condition of banks.  Examinations ensure the integrity of bank financial
statements and identify the banks that should be subject to supervisory sanctions.  During
a routine exam, the examiners assess six components of safety and soundness—capital
protection (C), asset quality (A), management competence (M), earnings strength (E),
liquidity risk (L) and market risk (S)—and assign a grade of 1 (best) through 5 (worst) to
each component.  Examiners then use these six scores to award a composite rating, also
expressed on a 1 through 5 scale.  Bank supervisors added the “S” component (market
risk) in January 1997.  Since examiners graded only five components of safety andThe Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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soundness during most of our sample period, this paper refers to composite “CAMEL”
ratings.  Table 1 interprets the five composite CAMEL ratings.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Although on-site examination is the most effective tool for constraining bank risk,
it is both costly to supervisors and burdensome to bankers.  As a result, supervisors face
continuous pressure to limit exam frequency.  Supervisors yielded to this pressure in the
1980s, and many banks escaped yearly examination (Reidhill and O’Keefe, 1997).
Congress mandated the frequency of examinations in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, which requires annual examinations for all but a
handful of small, well-capitalized, highly-rated banks, and even these institutions must be
examined every 18 months.  This new mandate reflects the lessons learned from the wave
of bank failures in the late 1980s: more frequent exams, though likely to increase the up-
front costs of supervision, reduce the down-the-road costs of resolving failures by
revealing problems at an early stage.
Although changes in public policy have mandated greater exam frequency since
the early 1990s, supervisors still have reasons to use off-site surveillance tools to flag
banks for accelerated exams and to plan exams.  Bank condition can deteriorate rapidly
between on-site visits (Cole and Gunther, 1998; Hirtle and Lopez, 1999).  In addition, the
Federal Reserve now employs a “risk-focused” approach to exams, in which supervisors
allocate on-site resources according to the risk exposures of each bank (Board of
Governors, 1996).  Off-site surveillance helps supervisors allocate on-site resources
efficiently by identifying institutions that need immediate attention and by identifying
specific risk exposures for regularly scheduled as well as accelerated exams.  For theseThe Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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reasons, an interagency body of bank and thrift supervisors—the Federal Financial
Institutions Examinations Council (FFIEC)—requires banks to submit quarterly Reports
of Condition and Income, often referred to as the call reports.  Surveillance analysts use
the call report data to monitor the condition of banks between exams.
Supervisors have developed various tools for using call report data to schedule
and plan exams, including econometric models.  A common type of model used in
surveillance estimates the marginal impact of a change in a financial ratio on the
probability that a bank will fail, holding all other ratios constant.  These models can
examine many ratios simultaneously, capturing subtle but important interactions.  The
Federal Reserve uses two models in off-site surveillance.  One model, called the SEER
risk rank model, combines financial ratios to estimate the probability that each Fed-
supervised bank will fail within the next two years.
   Another model estimates a
hypothetical CAMEL rating that is consistent with the financial data in the bank's most
recent call report.  Every quarter, economists at the Board of Governors feed the latest
call report data into these models and forward the results to each of the twelve Reserve
Banks.  Surveillance analysts in the Reserve Banks then investigate the institutions that
the models flag as “exceptions.”
III. ESTIMATION OF THE SEER RISK RANK MODEL
The SEER risk rank model is a probit model of bank failure.  The model uses call
report data as of one point in time to estimate the probability of banks failing or
becoming critically undercapitalized over the following two years.  The estimation period
spans the first quarter of 1985 to the last quarter of 1991.  Table 2 lists the independent
variables used in this failure prediction model.  The actual SEER coefficient estimates,The Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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which are part of the official Federal Reserve monitoring system, are not reported here
because they are confidential.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Because bank failures have been rare events since the early 1990s, the regression
coefficients have been “frozen” since 1991, rather than being re-estimated in more recent
years.  Simulation of this model is relevant for bank surveillance during a period of few
bank failures if the determinants of bank failure are also the determinants of CAMEL
downgrades, and if the weights on the various determinants of distress in banks included
in the model do not change much over time.  This paper investigates whether the ranking
of banks by their estimated probabilities of failure (from the SEER risk rank model)
provides reliable predictions of the banks most likely to have their CAMEL ratings
downgraded in future periods.
IV. ESTIMATION OF THE DOWNGRADE MODEL
To facilitate a direct comparison between the performance of the two models in
predicting CAMEL downgrades, we used the same independent variables in estimation of
the SEER risk rank model and the downgrade equations, which are listed in Table 2.  If
we used different independent variables in estimating the two models, we would not
know whether differences in the performance of the two models reflected different
independent variables or the estimation of the models with different dependent variables
(dummy variables for bank failures versus CAMEL downgrades).
We estimated the downgrade model for six separate years using probit regression
analysis.  Because there were considerably more CAMEL downgrades than failures in theThe Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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1990s, it was possible to re-estimate the downgrade model on a yearly basis.  See Table 3
for the number of downgrades each year.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
We chose the timing of  CAMEL ratings and call report data for the estimation
and simulation of the downgrade model to reflect the timing of the information that is
available to supervisors in practice.  Banks included in the sample for the first equation in
Table 4 were rated CAMEL 1 or 2 as of March 1990.  Call report data for the
independent variables listed in Table 2 were as of the fourth quarter of 1989 because
supervisors would not have access to the fourth quarter 1989 call report data for most
banks until some time in March 1990.  We assume that the supervisors would like to be
able to rank these banks currently rated CAMEL 1 or 2 by their probability of being
downgraded during the year 1991.  Supervisors also would like to have accurate
information on the banks most likely to be downgraded in the remainder of 1990, but
early intervention would require accurate information on the banks most likely to be
downgraded in 1991.
The dependent variable of the first equation had a value of unity if a bank had its
CAMEL rating downgraded from a 1 or 2 (satisfactory condition) to a CAMEL 3, 4 or 5
(problem bank status) in the calendar year 1991, zero otherwise.  We limited the sample
to banks that were examined at least once during the calendar year 1991 because
supervisors generally change the CAMEL ratings of banks only after exams.  We also
excluded banks from the sample if they were downgraded to problem bank status in April
through December of 1990, since these banks would not be included among the banks
downgraded during the year 1991.  The other five equations in Table 4 involve banks thatThe Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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were downgraded in the calendar years 1992 through 1996, with the same timing of the
observations on CAMEL ratings and call report data.
Using the same independent variables in the SEER risk rank model and this
downgrade model tends to limit the predictive power of the downgrade model.  It is likely
that an attempt to estimate the optimal downgrade model would yield at least some
independent variables not included in the SEER risk rank model.  For instance, some of
the independent variables with significant coefficients in the downgrade model in Gilbert,
Meyer and Vaughan (1999) are not included as independent variables in the downgrade
model in this paper.  Thus, the downgrade model in this paper is not designed to
minimize the errors in predicting which banks will have their CAMEL ratings
downgraded.  Instead, it is designed to facilitate a comparison of the SEER risk rank
model to a downgrade model.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Results in Table 4 indicate that the model fit for the downgrade regressions is
very good.  The coefficients on seven of the 11 variables are statistically significant at the
five-percent level in each of the six years, with the signs indicated in table 2.  The fit of
the model declines gradually each year, however, with more variables becoming
statistically insignificant later in the 1990s.  For instance, the coefficients on the ratio of
commercial and industrial loans to total assets were negative and statistically significant
at the five-percent level in the years 1991 through 1993, but insignificant in 1994 through
1996.  The coefficients on equity to total assets were positive and statistically significant
in the years 1991 through 1994, but insignificant in 1995 and 1996.  The poorer fit of theThe Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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downgrade model over time may reflect the decline in the number of downgrades
throughout the 1990s.
V. OUT-OF-SAMPLE MODEL PERFORMANCE
While a good in-sample model fit is important for determining whether a model is
statistically well specified, the real test for use in surveillance is its out-of-sample
predictive performance.  We use out-of-sample simulation to answer this question: Using
a model estimated with existing information, how well can we distinguish the banks that
will be downgraded in a future period from those that will not be downgraded?
The simulations are designed to reflect the information that supervisors could
have used at the time for early warning of future CAMEL downgrades.  The first out-of-
sample simulation involved banks rated CAMEL 1 or 2 as of March 1992.  We estimated
the probabilities that these banks would be downgraded to problem bank status in 1993
by plugging their call report data as of the fourth quarter of 1991 into the equation
estimated to predict downgrades in 1991.  The other out-of-sample simulations of the
downgrade model use the same lags for the other years.  For instance, we used the
coefficients on the sixth equation, estimated for banks downgraded in 1996, to estimate
the probabilities that the banks rated CAMEL 1 or 2 as of March 1997 would be
downgraded in 1998.
We used the following procedure to predict which banks would be downgraded to
problem bank status with the SEER risk rank model.  We ranked the banks in our sample
by their probability of failing in 1993 by plugging their call report data as of the fourth
quarter of 1991 into the SEER risk rank model and calculating the estimates of their
probabilities of failing.  We used this ranking by their probabilities of failing as a meansThe Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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of ranking these banks by their probabilities of being downgraded to problem bank status
in 1993.  To derive a ranking of banks by their probability of being downgraded in 1994,
we plugged their call report data as of the fourth quarter of 1992 into the SEER risk rank
model with its frozen coefficients.  We followed this procedure for each year, using the
model with the same coefficients and the new call report data.
In evaluating the out-of-sample performance of these models, we must consider
the trade-off between type-1 and type-2 errors.  The type-1 error rate is the percentage of
downgrades that we fail to detect with the model, while the type-2 error rate is the
percentage of healthy banks that we identify incorrectly as downgrade risks.  In a
traditional bank failure analysis, supervisors consider type-1 errors to be decidedly worse
than type-2 errors.  A bank failure imposes significant costs on society, including
required payouts by the FDIC insurance fund (and possibly the taxpayers) and possible
disruption to the bank’s local community (Gilbert and Kochin, 1989).  An early-warning
system that misses a significant number of failures (i.e., has a high type-1 error rate) is
highly undesirable.  Errors in predicting CAMEL downgrades in future periods are
considerably less serious than errors in predicting bank failures, but supervisors are
interested in tools that provide accurate early warnings of CAMEL downgrades, which
could enable them to provide added guidance to problem banks as early as possible.
On the other hand, a model that over-predicts failures and downgrades (i.e., has a
high type-2 error rate) also imposes costs in the form of unnecessary resources devoted to
the supervision of healthy banks.  These costs range from a few extra examiner hours
spent examining bank financial statements to the cost of stepped-up on-site examinations.
Type-2 errors also may impose unnecessary costs on healthy banks.  An explicitThe Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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calculation of the costs of each type of error, which would involve certain arbitrary
assumptions, is beyond the scope of this paper.  We choose instead to focus on the “risk-
return” trade-off along the entire range of errors by deriving type-1 vs. type-2 power
curves for the two models, following closely the methods used by Cole, Cornyn and
Gunther (1995).  Each curve tells us the type-1 error we must accept for any given level
of type-2 error.  Looking at the entire power curve avoids setting an arbitrary cut-off for
an acceptable level of type-1 or type-2 error.
To compute power curves for the SEER risk rank model and the downgrade
model, we adjust the number of banks rated by each model as likely to be downgraded
and observe the associated type-1 and type-2 errors.  At one extreme, all banks are rated
as unlikely to be downgraded.  Our type-1 error rate would be 100 percent, since all of
the downgrades would be recorded as errors.  The type-2 error rate would be zero, since
each bank that was not downgraded would be included among those not predicted to be
downgraded.  Next, we assume that the bank with the highest estimated probability of
failing (from the SEER risk rank model) or being downgraded (from the downgrade
model) is the one bank predicted to be downgraded in the future period.  For each model
we calculate the associated type-1 and type-2 errors.  We continue adding the bank with
the next highest estimated probability of failure or being downgrade to those already
estimated to be downgraded, and calculating type-1 and type-2 errors, until we have
traced out the entire power curve of type-1 and type-2 errors.  At the other extreme
position on the power curve, all banks are included among those estimated to be
downgraded in the future; the type-1 error rate is zero percent, and the type-2 error rate is
100 percent.The Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
15
The curvature of the power curves provides a basis for comparing the
performance of the two models.  The greater the curvature of the power curve, the better
the model.  In other words, we can simultaneously achieve low type-1 and type-2 error
rates using the model with the curve nearer the origin.  A convenient way to express this
curvature is to calculate the area under each power curve as a percentage of all of the area
in the box where the power curves are presented.  The smaller the area, the more accurate
the model.  A useful benchmark is the case in which the banks estimated to be
downgraded in the future are selected at random, rather than through simulation of a
model.  This procedure would produce a power curve with a slope of approximately
negative one, starting at the 100 percent type-1 error rate and extending to the 100
percent type-2 error rate.  The area under this curve would be approximately 50 percent
of the area in the entire box.  The areas under power curves in Figures 1 through 6
represent a clear improvement over a random selection of banks estimated to be
downgraded.
FIGURES 1 THROUGH 6 ABOUT HERE
The power curves in Figure 1 are virtually on top of each other, with the
downgrade curve slightly edging out the failure curve over most of the trade-off range in
1993.  The area under the power curve in Figure 1 for the downgrade model is 20.31
percent, only slightly better than the 21.47 percent for the SEER risk rank model.  The
similarity of these curves indicates the close relationship between the risk factors that
cause failures and those that cause less significant deterioration in the condition of banks.
Figure 2 shows a similar pattern for 1994 downgrades.  The spread between the power
curves starts to widen by 1995, however, and peaks at 5.12 percentage points in 1997.The Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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Table 5 summarizes the information about the areas under the power curves for each
year.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
The increase in the relative performance of the downgrade model over time has
several implications.  First, this pattern could indicate that the coefficients that assign
weights to the various risk factors are not stable over time.  If some variables were major
predictors of bank performance in some years, but not others, a model with frozen
coefficients would decline in usefulness over time.  Evidence of coefficient instability
over long periods indicates the value of re-estimating the model from time to time.
During the 1990s, re-estimation has been possible for the downgrade model, but not for
the failure model.  A second implication is that the relative predictive power of the
downgrade model increased over time even as its in-sample statistical properties
deteriorated.  Re-estimation of the coefficients of the downgrade model over time
enhanced the predictive power of the downgrade model, even with the deterioration over
time of the in-sample statistical properties of the downgrade model.  These results
indicate that during long periods of economic expansion when there are few bank
failures, a model estimated to predict the downgrades of CAMEL ratings can serve as a
useful supplement to an early warning model estimated to predict bank failures.
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper demonstrates that the SEER risk rank model, which was estimated to
predict which banks will fail, does a good job of identifying the banks that are likely to
have their supervisory ratings downgraded in future periods.  During a period with few
bank failures, however, a model estimated to predict CAMEL downgrades could improveThe Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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on the ability of the SEER risk rank model to predict downgrades.  We must recognize,
however, that our sample period is taken from the longest peacetime expansion in U.S.
economic history.  Consequently, a model designed to predict which healthy banks will
become unhealthy may do a poor job of predicting which unhealthy banks will ultimately
fail.  While a downgrade model may prove to be a useful supplement to the standard
failure prediction model during good times, we should be careful to have all of our
surveillance tools available to us during the next recession.
Use of both a bank failure model and a CAMEL downgrade model in bank
surveillance may be better than choosing to use one of these models.  Running more than
one model in parallel could help us examine more closely the causes of bank downgrades
that may be quite different from the causes of outright failure.  Furthermore, while a
downgrade model might serve admirably during periods of relative stability in the
banking system, a failure model might be a more important tool for surveillance during a
future period when the bank failure rate is higher than in recent years.The Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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NOTES
     1.   See Flannery and Houston (1999) for evidence that holding company inspections
help insure the integrity of financial statements.  See Gilbert and Vaughan (1998) for a
discussion of the sanctions available to bank supervisors.
     2.   See Hall, King, Meyer and Vaughan (1999) for a more detailed discussion of the
factors used to assign individual and composite ratings.
     3.   See Putnam (1983) for a description of the use of supervisory screens in off-site
surveillance during the late 1970s and early 1980s.The Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
20
REFERENCES
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1996). Risk-Focused Safety and
Soundness Examinations and Inspections. SR 96-14, May 24.
Cole, R.A., Cornyn, B.G. & Gunther, J.W. (1995). FIMS: A New Monitoring System for
Banking Institutions. Federal Reserve Bulletin, 81, 1-15.
Cole, R.A. & Gunther, J.W. (1998). A Comparison of On- and Off-Site Monitoring
Systems. Journal of Financial Services Research, 13, 103-17.
Flannery, M.J. & Houston, J.F. (1999). The Value of a Government Monitor for U.S.
Banking Firms. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 31, 14-34.
Gilbert, R.A., & Kochin, L.A. (1989). Local Economic Effects of Bank Failures. Journal
of Financial Services Research, 3, 333-45.
Gilbert, R.A., Meyer, A.P. & Vaughan, M.D. (1999). The Role of Supervisory Screens
and Econometric Models in Off-Site Surveillance. Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis Review, 81, 31-56.
Gilbert, R.A. & Vaughan, M.D. (1998). Does the Publication of Supervisory
Enforcement Actions Add to Market Discipline? Research in Financial
Services: Public and Private Policy, 10, 259-80.
Hall, J.R., King, T.B., Meyer, A.P. & Vaughan, M.D. (1999). Do Certificate of Deposit
Holders and Supervisors View Bank Risk Similarly?  A Comparison of the
Factors Affecting CD Yields and CAMEL Composites. Supervisory Policy
Analysis Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, October.The Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
21
Hirtle, B.J. & Lopez, J.A. (1999). Supervisory Information and the Frequency of Bank
Examinations. Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
5, No. 1, 1-19.
Putnam, B.H (1983). Early Warning Systems and Financial Analysis in Bank Monitoring:
Concepts of Financial Monitoring. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic
Review, November, 6-13.
Reidhill, J. & O’Keefe, J.O. (1997).  Off-Site Surveillance Systems, in History of the
Eighties: Lessons for the Future, volume I.  Washington: Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 477-520.The Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
22




Financial institutions with a composite 1 rating
are sound in every respect and generally have
individual component ratings of 1 or 2.
2
Financial institutions with a composite 2 rating
are fundamentally sound.  In general, a 2-rated
institution will have no individual component
ratings weaker than 3.
3
Financial institutions with a composite 3 rating
exhibit some degree of supervisory concern in
one or more of the component areas.
4
Financial institutions with a composite 4 rating
generally exhibit unsafe and unsound practices or
conditions.  They have serious financial or
managerial deficiencies that result in
unsatisfactory performance.
5
Financial institutions with a composite 5 rating
generally exhibit extremely unsafe and unsound
practices or conditions.  Institutions in this group
pose a significant risk the deposit insurance fund
and their failure is highly probable.
Source: Federal Reserve Commercial Bank Examination ManualThe Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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Table 2.  Regression Variables Used to Predict Bank Failures and CAMEL Downgrades
This table lists the independent variables used in both the SEER risk rank model and the
downgrade regression model.  The signs indicate the hypothesized relationships between the
variables and the likelihood of a safety-and-soundness problem.  For example, the negative sign
for the return-on-assets ratio indicates that other things equal, a higher ROA would reduce the
likelihood of a failure or CAMEL downgrade.
Symbol Description
Hypothesis about the sign of the
coefficient for predicting failure or
CAMEL downgrades (positive sign
indicates positive correlation with
probability of failure or rating
downgrade).
ROA Return on average assets. –
COMMERCIAL-
LOANS
Commercial and industrial loans as a percentage
of total assets.
+
NET-WORTH Total net worth (equity capital minus goodwill)
as a percentage of total assets.
–
OREO Other real estate owned as a percentage of total
assets.
+
PAST-DUE-30 Loans past due 30-89 days as a percentage of
total assets.
+
PAST-DUE-90 Loans past due 90+ days as a percentage of total
assets.
+
NONACCRUING Nonaccrual loans as a percentage of total assets. +










Residential real estate loans as a percentage of
total assets.
–
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets, in thousands of
dollars.
–The Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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Table 3.  Banks Rated CAMEL 1 or 2 that were Downgraded to CAMEL 3, 4, or 5
This table shows the number of our sample banks that were downgraded from CAMEL 1 or 2 to
3, 4 or 5 in each year.  We excluded from the sample any banks that received downgrades to
problem status the same year as the CAMEL 1 or 2 observation.  As overall banking performance
improved in the mid-1990s, the percentage of banks suffering downgrades fell, but there was an
upward trend in the late 1990s, and downgrades were still much more common than failures.









March 1990 (1991) 1 2,057 79 3.84
2 5,037 988 19.60
March 1991 (1992) 1 1,956 51 2.61
2 4,987 670 13.43
March 1992 (1993) 1 1,978 17 0.86
2 5,246 295 5.62
March 1993 (1994) 1 2,046 14 0.68
2 5,040 185 3.67
March 1994 (1995) 1 2,363 13 0.55
2 4,463 129 2.89
March 1995 (1996) 1 2,596 13 0.50
2 3,964 136 3.43
March 1996  (1997) 1 2,655 13 0.49
2 3,394 157 4.63
March 1997  (1998) 1 2,574 27 1.05
2 2,803 194 6.92The Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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Table 4.  In-Sample Fit of the Downgrade Model
This table presents the estimated regression coefficients for the downgrade model.  The model
predicts in-sample downgrades (“1” represents a downgrade; “0” denotes no downgrade) for
calendar year t with call report data for the fourth quarter of year t-2.  For example, observations
on whether banks had their CAMEL ratings downgraded in 1993 were related to call report data
for the fourth quarter of 1991.  Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficients.
Three asterisks denote significance at the one-percent level; two asterisks denote significance at
the 5-percent level.   Shading highlights coefficients that were significant with the correct sign in
all six years.  Overall, the evidence in this table suggests that the logit model predicted in-sample
downgrades well.
Years of downgrades in CAMEL ratings:











































































-2 log likelihood testing
  whether all coefficients









Commercial and industrial loans as a
percentage of total assets




Residential real-estate loans as a percentage of
total assets
NONACCRUING Loans on nonaccrual status as a percentage of total
loans
ROA Net income as a percentage of total assets. LARGE-TIME-
DEPOSITS
Large denomination time deposit liabilities as
a percentage of total assets. SECURITIES Book value of securities as a percentage of total assets
NET-WORTH Equity less goodwill as a percentage of total
assets
OREO Other real estate owned as a percentage of total assets
PAST-DUE-90 Loans over 90 days past due as a percentage
of total loans
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets, in thousands of
dollars.The Role of a CAMEL Downgrade Model in Bank Surveillance
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Table 4 (continued).  How Well Does the Downgrade Model Fit the CAMEL Downgrade
Data?
Years of downgrades in CAMEL ratings:











































































-2 log likelihood testing
  whether all coefficients
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Table 5.  Out-of-Sample Predictive Performance of the SEER Risk Rank Model and the
Downgrade Model
This table shows the areas under the “power curves” in Figures 1 through 6, along with the
percentage-point differences between the areas for the two models.  A power curve graphically
illustrates the trade-off between type-1 errors (the percentage of missed downgrades) and type-2
errors (the percentage of misidentified non-downgrades).  A convenient way to compare curves is
to calculate the area under each curve.  In this context, smaller is better because smaller areas
imply simultaneously lower error rates of both types.  As shown below, the difference in the areas
increases slowly over time, indicating that the downgrade model’s performance, relative to the











1 1993 20.31% 21.47% 1.16%
2 1994 29.49% 30.66% 1.17%
3 1995 24.44% 26.87% 2.43%
4 1996 20.07% 24.31% 4.24%
5 1997 19.91% 25.03% 5.12%




















Figure 1:  What is the Trade-off Between False Negatives and False Positives in
                  the Downgrade Prediction Model Compared to the SEER Model?
This figure shows the trade-off between the type-1 error rate and the type-2 error rate.  The type-1 error rate is the 
percentage of banks rated CAMEL-1 or -2 that were subsequently downgraded by supervisors but were not 
identified by the given model.  The type-2 error rate is the percentage of banks rated CAMEL-1 or -2 that were not 
subsequently downgraded but were misidentified by the given model as a downgrade risk.  A desirable early-
warning system minimizes the level of type-2 errors for any given level of type-1 errors.  This graph shows that the 
SEER risk rank model and the downgrade model have about the same type-1 and type-2 tradeoffs for any level of 
the type-1 error above 50 percent.  For most levels of type-1 error below 50 percent, the downgrade model yields a 
lower type-2 error rate than the SEER risk rank model.  A convenient way to express this difference in 
performance is to calculate the percentage of the area in the figure that is under each curve.  Smaller areas are more 
desirable because they imply simultaneously low levels of both types of errors.  In the above graph, the downgrade 

























Figure 2:  What is the Trade-off Between False Negatives and False Positives in
                  the Downgrade Prediction Model Compared to the SEER Model?
This figure shows the trade-off between the type-1 error rate and the type-2 error rate.  The type-1 error rate is 
the percentage of banks rated CAMEL-1 or -2 that were subsequently downgraded by supervisors but were not 
identified by the given model.  The type-2 error rate is the percentage of banks rated CAMEL-1 or -2 that were 
not subsequently downgraded but were misidentified by the given model as a downgrade risk.  A desirable early-
warning system minimizes the level of type-2 errors for any given level of type-1 errors.  This graph shows a 
similar tradeoff between type-1 and type -2 errors with both models.  A convenient way to express the difference 
between the performance of these models is to calculate the percentage of the area in the figure that is under 
each curve.  Smaller areas are more desirable because they imply simultaneously low levels of both types of 


























Figure 3:  What is the Trade-off Between False Negatives and False Positives in
                  the Downgrade Prediction Model Compared to the SEER Model?
This figure shows the trade-off between the type-1 error rate and the type-2 error rate.  The type-1 error rate is 
the percentage of banks rated CAMEL-1 or -2 that were subsequently downgraded by supervisors but were not 
identified by the given model.  The type-2 error rate is the percentage of banks rated CAMEL-1 or -2 that were 
not subsequently downgraded but were misidentified by the given model as a downgrade risk.  A desirable early-
warning system minimizes the level of type-2 errors for any given level of type-1 errors.  This graph shows that 
for almost all levels of type-1 error, the downgrade model leads to fewer type-2 errors than the SEER failure 
model.  A convenient way to express this difference in performance is to calculate the percentage of the area in 
the figure that is area under each curve.  Smaller areas are more desirable because they imply simultaneously low 
levels of both types of errors.  In the above graph, the downgrade model outperforms the SEER model by 24.44 

























Figure 4:  What is the Trade-off Between False Negatives and False Positives in
                  the Downgrade Prediction Model Compared to the SEER Model?
 This graph shows that for most levels of type-1error, the downgrade model leads to fewer type-2 errors than the 
SEER failure model.  A convenient way to express this difference in performance is to calculate the percentage 
of the area in the figure that is under each curve.  Smaller areas are more desirable because they imply 
simultaneously low levels of both types of errors.  In the above graph, the downgrade model outperforms the 

























Figure 5:  What is the Trade-off Between False Negatives and False Positives in
                  the Downgrade Prediction Model Compared to the SEER Model?
This graph shows that for almost all levels of type-1 error, the downgrade model leads to fewer type-2 errors 
than the SEER failure model.  A convenient way to express this difference in performance is to calculate the 
percentage of the area in the figure that is under each curve.  Smaller areas are more desirable because they 
imply simultaneously low levels of both types of errors.  In the above graph, the downgrade model outperforms 

























Figure 6:  What is the Trade-off Between False  Negatives and False Positives in
                  the Downgrade Prediction Model Compared to the SEER Model?
 This graph shows that for almost evey level of type I error rate tolerated by supervisors, the downgrade model 
leads to slightly fewer type-2 errors than the SEER failure model.  A convenient way to express this difference in 
performance is to calculate the percentage of the area in the figure that is under each curve.  Smaller areas are 
more desirable because they imply simultaneously low levels of both types of errors.  In the above graph, the 
downgrade model outperforms the SEER model by 23.02 percent to 25.81 percent.
SEER Model
25.81%
Downgrade 
Model
23.02%